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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellants filed two actions in the District Court of
Cache County, Utah, to set aside and vacate the ,transfer of certain realty and personalty to a sister, Archulius Archibald, and a brother, Wallace Buttars, made by
their mother Emma G. Buttars, deceased. The cases
were numbered Civil Case No. 7605 and Civil Case No.
7607.
In case 7605 the appellants were the plaintiffs and
Archulius Archibald was the principal defendant. It was
to her in that case the transfer of the property was made
or attempted to be made. The other defendants were
joined as heirs of Emma G. Buttars, deceased, because
.they did not desire to be joined as partie's plaintiff.
In case No. 7607 Appellants were the plaintiffs and
Wallace Buttars was the principal defendant. It was
to him the transfers of the estate and personal property
were made. The othe,r defendants were joined for the
same reason as mentioned in Civil Case No. 7605.
In both cases the plaintiffs and defendants constituted the heirs at law of Emma G. Buttars, deceased.
She was the grantor and donor.
In each case the appellants charged that there existe'd a confidential relationship between Emma G. Buttars, the grantor, and the grantees, her children, and that
the transfers were made while the grantor was incompetent or mentally and physically infirm and that they
were induced by undue influence, that the personal property was not delivered in the lifetime of the donor.
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On. stipulation the cases were consolidate d and tried
together.
Separate fin dings of fact, conclusions of law and
decrees were entered in each case.
Subsequent to the death of Emma G. Buttars some
of her grandchildren contested the admitting of her will
to probate. It waJs entitled Probate file No. 5167. The
case was appeal~d to the Supreme Court, your file No.
1945, and this Court sustained the District Court's action
in setting aside the verdict of the jury who had held that
Emma G. Buttars was incompetent to make a will.
In the interest of economy and time it was stipulate:d that all of the proceedings, the evidence and exhibits of the will contest was admitted in evidence in the
trial of the consolidated cases subject to its materiality
and admissability, and that each of the parties could introduce such evidence as they desired except no further
evidence would be offered on the question of Emma G.
Buttars' incompetency except as it was incrdental to the
evidence being presented. (RR 56, 57).
In Civil Case No. 7605 wherein Archulius Archibald
was the principal defendant the trial court entered judgment refusing to vacate the two deeds, U.S. Government
.bonds in question. However, it decreed that the bank
stock in que'Stion had not been delivered and that it was
the property of the appellants and respon<lents subject
to probate under the terms of the la'st will and testament
of Emma G~ Buttars. (RR 30-41).
In Civil Case No. 7607 wherein Wallace Buttars was
the principal defendant the court refused to vacate the
1

1
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two deeds and go<vernment bonds in question. However,
it decreed that a joint sa<vings account in the names of
Wallace Buttars and Emma G. Buttars in the First Security Bank of Logan in the 'sum of $5,000.00 plus interest was the soie property of the defendant subject to
the payment of the funeral and last illness expenses of
Emma G. Buttars.
In the will contest case the numbering of the record
wa:s not changed. The proceedings, pleadings and transcript of the consolidated cases began with page 1. In
the will contest ca:se the pages were numbered 1 to 400
and in the pleadings and e'Vidence in the two consolidated cases are numbered 1 to 239. For the purpose
of identification when referring to that part of the record made in the will contest cruse we will identify it as
R -------- and the subsequent record as RR ----····· Ci'Vil
Case No. 7605 is Case No. 8177 and Case No. 7607 is
Case· No. 8178, in this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FACTS PERTAINING TO BOTH CASES
Appellants and respondents are the children and
grandchildren of Daniel Buttars and Emma G. Buttars,
deceased. All of their married li<ves they were residents
of Clarkston, a small farming community in Cache
County. They reared a large family, ten children, and
accumulated extensi<ve farming interests. Daniel Buttars died in Clarkston, January 10, 1916 and at the time
his children were of the following ages: Daniel, 33 years;
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Margaret, 29 year's; Melvin H., 27 years; Orson M., 24
years; MaheU, 22 years; Gover, 20 years; Ira, 17 years;
Hattie, 15 years; Archulius, principal defendant, 12
years, and Wallace, the other principal defendant, 9
years. (Ex. 27.)
Sometime prior to his death the father, Daniel Buttars, gave and sold to his e~dest sons certain lands a:s
follows: to Daniel he gave 80 acres and sold him 80 acres;
to Melvin he gave 80 acres and sold him 80 acres; to
Orson he gave 80 acres and 'sold him 80 acres; to Gover
he gave 60 acres; and to Ira he gave 60 acres. (RR 118,
122).
He gave no land to any of the daughters in his
lifetime and none was given to the defendant Wallace
Buttars, the youngest son. There was a good reason for
the land gifts to the erder sons. In each in'stance, except
Wallace, they had worked with their parents and helped
accumulate the property. The boys were not paid wages,
only given their food, clothing and spending money.
The land was given when they married and left home
except as to Ira and his was given just before his father's
death. (RR 118, 122).
The estate of Daniel Buttar's was probated, the
widow, Emma G. Buttars received her statutory onethird and the children each received their distributive
share. Decree of Distribution was entered March 10,
1917. Daniel, Melvin and Emma G. Buttars were the
administrators. (Ex. 27).
Emma G. Buttars never re-married and she and
her sons Ira and Gover operated the farm for some
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year's. Ira later married, sold his 60 acres to his bother
Gover and moved to Burley, Idaho. Gover then operated
the fa:rm until 1930 when he also moved to Burley anij
he then sold his 120 acres to his mother, thus adding this
acreage to her holdings. F·rom 1930 to the date of his
mother's death on JUly 1, 1952, Wallace operated the
farm for her on a lease basis. (R 173, 176, 177, 331).
Emma G. Buttars was 51 years of age when widowed
in 1916. She never had any serious illness until 1940,
when she was. 75 years of age. All the testimony is to
the effect that at all times when she enjoyed good health
she was 'self-reliant, f·rugal, determined and had a firm
will of her own. (R 223). Was inclined to be close or
even stingy and believed everyone should work and earn
what they got, ( R 201, 215, 226, 292) and, in fact, she
kept her own holdings intact and added thereto until the
conveyances and transfers hereinafter mentioned and
which were made by her after she was 80 years of age
and 'six days after she made her will in which she stated
she desired to treat all of her children equally. (R 219).
Advancing years made their impact on her health.
In 1940 she had her first serious illness (R 145). She
was then hospitalized in the Cache Valley Hospital,
Logan, Utah. She suffered from high blood pressure,
hardening of the arteries, heart ailment, pneumonia, kidney trouble and thereafter suffered terrible headaches.
(R. 145, 201, 226). Thereafter she was never the same,
physically or mentally. This was the testimony of her
grandchildren who had seen her more or less frequently,
(R 293) and according to her own children who waited
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upon her and 'Saw her almost daily or at short intervals.
(R 168, 201). After this illness from which she never
fully recovered she continued to deteriorate: physically
and mentally. (R 185, 186, 201, 203) an!d in 1944 she was
again seriously ill and hospitalized. (R 203).
After her first illness in 1940, a serious and obvious
change came over Emma G. Buttars - her mind continued to deteriorate. (R 146, 185, 203). She could not
remember, particularly recent events, even from morning until later in the day, (R 31, 43, 150, 146, 147, 201,
203) nor remember her eldest grandson, whom she knew
best, (R 31, 33, 34, 42, 53) nor their wives. She did not
realize that her eldest son, Dan, was dead, his death
occurring February 21, 1945 (R 30-37, 42). A few days
over a month before the transfers hereinafter mentioned
were ·commenced, she worried over finances, (R 202, 204,
190); her mind was confused as to whether she had
enough to live on when in fact she was well fixed (R 167,
190) ; she disliked people for no apparent reason, would
repeat, asking the same thing over and over again, (R
168, 203); was incoherent and could not stick to a subject,
(R 228, 157); hid silverware in her bed, (R 202, 227);
accused some of her children of borrowing money from
her when they did not (R 227, 229); hid money, couldn't
distinguish between her own property and others and
claimed her son's turkeys as her own (R 158); stayed
in all of the time ( R 228-30). Even the family did not
want her condition generally known. She did not know
what she had possessed in the way of property, (R 204205, 208), or what she had done or signed away and
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couldn't handle any amount of money (R 204, 211, 222,
223, 228) ; purchased a dress to go to the funeral of her
son Ira, who died in 1949, and then forgot he had died.
(R 109, 212). She did not know pursuant to arrangements that her son, Wallace, was handling her finances,
writing her checks, etc. (R 213, 344-50); did not know,
pursuant to arrangements, that her own daughters were
being paid by her son Wallace, from her money, for
taking turns in caring for her. (R 215).
On July 1, 1918, Dan borrowed $1500.00 from hi's
mother on his note payable on or before five years after
date, and at the same time gave her a mortgage· as security therefor, which was never recorded. (Con. Exs.
2 and 3). Dan's cancelled check dated January 17, 1923,
payable to the deceased and upon which 'She had written
"Paid in full" was produced. (Con. Ex. 1). No one ever
heard her 'Say Dan owed her money (R 211). She filed
no claim against D·an's estate. She was always affectionate toward Dan, her eldest son, yet one month before
drawing her will she showed no emotion at his passing.
(R 211). In her will 'She said she wanted to treat all
of her children alike, then omitted her son Dan's children becau'se she had forgotten he had repaid the loan.
She said he owed her more than his share of the estate
would amount to. (Ex. A).
In 1944, W a1lace and Archulius, the principal defendants, called the family together and a meeting was
hela at Margaret's place. Margaret, Gover, Melvin, Archulius and Wallace were present. It was there reported
by Archulius and Wallace that their mother was not in
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a condition, physically or mentally, to be left al'one.
:Melvin sugge~sted appointment of a guardian. It was
opposed particularly by Wallace who said that he ~ould
take care of his mother's affairs and that no guardian
was needed. (R 181, 182, 216, 225, 389, RR 86, 88, 89).
In 1950 another meeting was calle d by Wallace and
Archulius again regarding their mother and at this meeting it was decided the girls woUld take turns caring for
their mother, be paid for it, and thereafter Wallaee would
write and sign the checks for the payment of all of his
mother's obligations. (RR 90-92).
1

On March 28, 1945, six days after she made her will,
in direct contradiction to its express provisions that she
was treating her family equally, she deeded 60 ·acre's of
land worth $12,000.00 to Wallace reserving a life estate.
The conveyance was without consideration. (Def. Ex. 21;
RR 127, 137, 138).
Again on January 28, 1947, without consideration
Mrs. Buttars deeded 48 acres of land to Archulius worth
approximately $9,600.00, reserving a life estate. (Cont.
Ex. 22; RR 136, 137, 145).
On the same date, January 29, 1947, she transferred
$5,000.00 from her account in the First Security Bank at
Logan to the First National Bank of Logan and opened
a j9int ·savings account, without consi'deration, with w allace. (R 366, 367; Con. Ex. 13, Ex. 11).
On March 3, 1948, she sold to Archulius land worth
$2,000.00 for $500.00 (Con. Ex. 22; RR 136; R 99, 198).
Aga:in on May 6, 1948, she gave Wallace, without
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·consideration, another 60 acre tract of 'land wor.th $12,000.00. (Con. Ex. 24; RR 127, 137, 138).
On the date Mrs. Buttars made her will she had
about 330 acres of land worth approximately $66,400.00
and on the date of her death she had about 160 acres
of land worth about $33,600.00. This included her home
at Clarkston. The value of the property on the date of
making her will and the date of the transfers was the
same at the date of her death. (R 194; RR 136, 139).
When her safety deposit box was opened in the First
Security Bank at Logan, it contained several instruments
including U. S. Savings bonds and stock certificates. Of
the contents of the box she attempted to make the following gifts: to Archulius $1000.00 maturity value U. S.
Savings bond dated April, 1948, and 22 share'S of First
Security Corporation stock (since split 4 to 1) worth
approximately $880.00. Attached to the savings bond
and stock certificate was a state·ment signed by Mrs.
Buttars dated April 9, 1945, which sa:id she wa·s making
this gift because the Clarkston Mill Stock Archulius rec·eived from her father's estate had become valueless.
To her also was three $500.00 maturity value U. S. Savings Bonds dated April, 1948. (Ex. 7, RR 62; Pl. Ex.
1-A, RR 72).
To Hattie, a sister, a $1000.00 maturity value U. S.
Savings bond dated April, 1948, and 22 shares of First
Secur'ity Corporation stock (since spJit 4 to 1) worth
approximately $880.00. Attached to the savings bond and
stock certificate was a statement signed by Mrs. Buttars
dated April 9, 1945, which said she was making this gift
1
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because the Clarkston Mill stock Hattie received from
her father's estate had become valuele'ss. To her also
was three $500.00 maturity value U. S. Savings bonds
dated April, 1948. (RR 63, 64; Pl. Ex. 9-A; Ex. 7).
When their father's estate was probated both Archulius and Hattie,. sisters, were decreed stock in the
Clarkston,.Trenton Mill which, alth ough valuable at the
time worth approximately $2,640.00 to each, it later
became vaiueless. (RR 107).
To Wallace one $100.00 maturity value U. S. Savings Bond dated December, 1944, one $1,000.00 maturity
.value U. S. Savings Bond dat~d April; 1948, and a $25.00
maturity value U. S. Savings Bond date'd April, 1948.
(RR,63, Ex. 7).
1

To a grandson, Milton Buttars, she gave a $500.00
maturity value and one $50.00 maturity value Savings
Bonds dated April, 1948. (Cont. Ex. 7).
All. of these savings bonds were made payable to
Mrs. Buttars and a joint payee, a's the case may be.

On the date of her death :Mrs. Buttars ha;d a $9,437.58
savings account in the First Security Bank at Logan
and a checking account in the sum of $2,093.64. (R 391).
~o

Wallace she had given or attempted to give property worth approximately $30,125.00. (Ex. 7; R. 366, 367;
Con. Ex. 13; Ex. 11, 127, 138, 137, 136, 145).
To Archulius she gave or attempted to give property worth approximately $12,980.~0. (Ex. 7, 1-A; RR
62, 72).
T'o Hattie she gave or attempted to give property
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worth approximately $3,380.00. (RR 63, 64; Pl. Ex. 9-A,
Ex. 7).
She made no gifts to any of her other children in
her lifetime.
Had her estate been left :lnta~t a;s intended by the
will on her death i't would have been worth approximately
$97,166.22. Instead it had a value of appro~tely
$45,131.22.
Although Mrs.. Buttars gave approximately 48 acres
of land worth about $9,600.00 to Archulius she gave no
land or other property except that which was found in
the safe ty 'deposit box aforementioned to Hattie. (RR 97).
1

The execution and delivery of the deeds to both
Wallace and Archulius and the $5,000.00 savings account
were made without the knowledge of the other brothers
and sisters and the family did not learn of the deeds 'to
Wallace and the savings account until the fall of 1950.
(R 192, 216, 217, 239; RR 92, 93, 94, 95, 102). However,
·one of the sisters learned of the deeds to Archulius about
a year after they were made. (RR 102). Just when Archulius and Wallace learned of the transfer to ea~h other
i:s n·ot known.
In 1951 and 1952, Mrs. Buttars was worried over
what she had done with her property and asked her
daughters to straighten out her affairs. (R 237, 238, 255).
After her husband's death Mrs. Buttars always had
one of her sons, Gover, Ira or Wallace wi'th her to help
her transact her business. (R 175, 176, 177).
The family had complete confidence in Archulius and
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Wallace in their handling of their mother's affairs until
1950. (R 216, 217).
Mrs.. Buttars' will was drafted on March 22, 1945,
by Newel G. Daines, an attorney at Logan, Utah, who was
recommended to her by Wallace. She was taken to his
office by him for this purpose although he denied he
knew she was going to make a will or that she had made
one. The will was made and executed with the advice of
the lawyer. (R 381, 382).
All of appellants' witnesses and the defendant Wallace who stated that 'they never ever heard their mother
expr~ss any dis'satisfaction with the terms of the said
Final Decree of Distribution and Partition.

FACTS PERTAINING PRIMARILY TO ARCHULIUS
Archulius, after her father's death, when she was 12
years of age, lived with her mother until her marriage
in 1921. After that she lived across the street from her.
(RR 77, 78).
After 1944 she helped her mother with the keeping
of the family record book, the buying of neces·sities, groceries, etc., her mother entrusted her in ~he cashing of
checks and checks signed by her mother in blank. ( RR
81, 82). Her mother also entrusted her with the $5,000.00
·savings deposit book. (RR 85).
When Mrs. Buttars' safety deposit box was opened
after her death, there was found a 's:tatement therein
dated April 9, 1945, signed by her to which was attached
a $5,000.00 maturity value U. S. Savings Bond and 22
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shares of First Security Corporation stock (now 88
shares) worth $880.00. The statement 'said her mother
was giving her lhe bond and stock because the ClarkstonTrenton Mill stock which Archulius received from her
father's estate turned out to be valueless. (R 62, Ex.
1-A). There were also in the deposit box three $500.00
maturity value U. S. Savings Bonds in favor of Arohulius. (Ex. 7). In the 'safety deposit box there was also
found the same amount of stock and bonds for Hattie
together with a statement to the same effect as that
attached to Archulius' stock. (Ex. 7; RR 63; Pl. Ex. 99-A).
On January 29, 1947, Archulius said ·she took her
mother 'to the office of 0. S. Crockett at which time her
mother executed a deed giving her approximately 48
acres of land worth $9,600.00. (RR 98; Ex. 22; RR 136,
137, 145).
Her explanation for this gift was that her mother
told her 'she was giving it to her because her ClarkstonTrenton Mill stock became valueless. (R 191, 192; RR
92, 94).
Both Archulius and her si's'ter Hattie received the
same amount of mill stock from their father's estate and
in both cases it became worthless. At the time of the
distribution it wa;s worth $2,640.00 to each. Hattie was
not given any land or other property by her mother,
except the stocks and bonds mentioned. (RR 97).
On March 3, 1948, Archulius purchased from her
mother 10.25 acres of land worth $2,000.00 for $500.00.
She took her mother to the office of 0. S. Crockett,
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abstra:cter and notary public, who prepared the deeds.
(Con. Ex. 21, RR 136,99, 198).
After her mother had transferred $5,000.00 from the
First Security Bank of Logan to the First National Bank
of Logan and created a joint savings account with Wallace, Archulius had her mother eliminate Wallace's name
from the account and took her to Logan to the Fir·s.t
National Bank for this purpo·se, supervising the act.
(R 192, 213, 239; RR 93, 94). Subsequently, as hereinafter appears, Walla:ce again triumphed and had his
mother reinstate his name to the account.
Archulius said her mother did not read the deed to
the 48 acres before signing it and that she might just as
well have had the City Creek property. This consisted
of about 160 acres and worth $27,800.00. (R 191; RR 136,
~39)

Archulius never told any member of 'the family that
her mother was giving her the 48 acres or se1ling her
the 10.25 acres prior to or at the time the transfers were
made and they did not learn of it until the fall of 1950,
except that one sister, Maybell, wa:s told of it about a
year after. (R 216, 217; RR 92).
When Archulius and Maybell were asked by their
mother to straighten out the me·ss she was in regarding
her affairs Archulius said to Maybell, "Let's not bother
her about them." (R 238).
Archulius and Wallace in 1944 called the family
together to consider the care of their mother and the
management of he·r affairs. When her brother Melvin
suggested the appointment of a guardian to take care
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of her mother's finances and affairs she and Wallace
joined with the others in opposing it. (R 181, 182, 216,
225, 389 ; RR 86, 88, 89).
Margaret testified that her mother told her, while
looking thr'ough the window toward the Archibald's that
she wished they would quit hounding her about her property. (RR. 211, 212).
FACTS PERTAINING PRIMARILY TO
WALLACE BUTTARS
Wallace after his marriage lived next door to his
mother and talked with her twice a day. (R. 368) He
began to manage and operate her property, approximately 300 acre·s, on a lease basis, in 1930, and to take
care of her financial affairs. (R 173, 175, 177, 331, 378).
He advised her what checks to sign, bil1s to pay,
and she consul ted him regarding her financial affairs.
(R. 354, 379, 386).
They binned their wheat separately until they
started to gelt government loans. on it and then they
binned it together and secured their loans jointly. (R
354).
He made bank deposits for her and with the assistance of Darrell Crockett made out her income tax returns, and kept in his possession her cancelled che'Cks
from 1946 'On. He said he didn't keep checks prior to
1946. (R 366, RR 216).
He testified that she re1ied on him in the management of her affairs and that she had implicit confidence
in him. (R 379, 380).
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He advised with her regarding certain legal instruments and recommended that she consult with Newel G.
Daines, a Logan attorney, regarding her affairs and
took her to his office for this purpose. However, he
denied that he knew she made a will and of its provisions
that she intended to treat her family equally. (R 366,
381, 382, 387' 399).
On March 28, 1945, six days after she made her will,
he took her to Logan to the offi'ce o.f A. B. Crockett, a
notary publi'c and abstracter, for the making of the deed
to him of the 60 acres of land worth $12,000.00. (R 127,
137, 138; Con. Ex. 24; De f. Ex. 21). He 'said his mother
gave him this property because he did not get anything
like 'the rest of them got when his dad was alive. (R 383,
384).
He claimed that he did not know that his mother
had 'Created a joint savings account covering $5,000.00
on January 28, 1947, with him until she told him on the
way home. However, in reply to a letter from the bank
to his mother requesting clarification of its records as
to whether the account was originally intended to be a
joint account with his,mother he wrote for her signature,
such was, the case, (Con. Ex. 19 ; R 386, 387, 395, 396),
and he gave no reason for the $5,000.00 gift.
His sister Archulius persuaded her mother to take
his name off the $5,000.00 savings account which she dfd
and after learning of this he had his mother again include his name on the account. (R 191, 213, 239; RR
93, 94).
On May 6, 1948, he again took his mother to the
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office of the Crocketts and 0. S. Cro~ke.tt, abstracter and
Jllotary public, made the deed to the second 60 acre tract
of land from his mother. He said his mother gaye him
this becau·se the others got ·sixty or eighty when they
were 20 to 22 years oJ:d. (R 385).
The defendant Wa1lace Buttars was 9 years of age
when his falther died. He had not helped accumulate any
property and he was not given any by hi's father. (RR
123). However, after his father's death, his mother,
Emma G. Buttars, was appointed guardian and from
the income from the property he received from his father'·s estate, she, as his guardian, purchased for him a
tract of 40 acres and a one-half in'te·re'st in another traet
of 120 a:cres. (RR 129, 130, 131).
He and his sister Archulius ·called a fami'ly meeting
in 1944 regarding their mother's health and financial
affairs and when his brother Melvin suggested the appointment of a guardian to take care of his mother'·s
financiaJ. affair's he anij other members of the family
in'cluding Ar'chulius opposed it and he said he could take
care of her financial affairs and no guardian was needed.
(R. 389, 182). And he did manage her financial affairs
until her de·ath. He said he never did anything on his
mother's farm or regarding it for whi'ch he was not paid.
(R 341).
The Buttars family had confidence in Wallace's
management of their mother's affairs up until the fall
of 1950. (R 379 ,380, 216, 217).
He did not tell any of his brothers or sisters that
his mother was going to give him either of the two tracts
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of land or the $5,000.00 savings account. And, except for
Archulius, they did not learn of it until tile fall of
1950. (R. 192, 216, 217, 239; RR 92, 93, 94, 95, 102, 211).
The $5,000.00 savings pass book was not produced
nor found in the home. {RR 212 to 217). Archulius had
the keys to her mother's home and after her death when
the will was read she gave the key to Wall~e. (RR 230).

ERRORS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL
Case No. 8177
·The Court erred in failing to fin'd that the grantor
was enfeebled in mind and body; that there existed a
confidential relationship between her and the defendant
Archulius. Archibald and that Archulius exercised undue
influence in procuring the deeds an!d personal property
in question and in failing to order an aecounlting of the
rents and profits; and in entering ju'dgment in favor of
the defendant Archulius Archibald and against the plaintiffs; and in decreeing that the defendant Archulius
Archibald was th~ owner in fee simple of the land covered by the two deeds 1to her in question and in awarding
her the United States Government Bonds.
Case No. 8178
That the court erred in failing to find that the grantor
was enfeebled in mind and body; that there exislted a
confidential relationship between her and the defendant
Walla:ce Buttars and that the deeds in question, the
$5,000.00 savings bank account and the government bonds
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were procured by the defendant Wallace Buttars by undue
influence, and in failing to order an accounting of the
rents and profits, and in entering judgment in faV'or of
the defendant W al1ace Buttars and against the plaintiffs
and awarding to the defendant Wallace Buttars the property covered by the two deeds in question, and any interest whatsover in the $5000.00 savings account together
with interest.
QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
1. W a!s the grantor Emma G. Buttars enfeebled in mind
and body at the time of the transaction'S in question¥
2. Did there exist between the grantor and the defendants Archulius Archibald and Wallace Buttars a confidential rel~ationship~
3. W e·re the gifts the result of undue influence and did
the grantees discharge their burden of proof and
establish that the transaction1s were free from overreaJching and undue influence~
PREFACE TO ARGUMENT
By way of preface we want it understood that we
are not here to rehash, criticize or attack the decision
of this Court In Re: Buttars's Estate 261 P. 2d, 171, the
Will contest case. The only question presented in that
case wrus whether Emma G. Buttars had the requisite
mental capa:city to make a will where in this case the real
question is whether in light of all the facts and circumstances, did Archulius and Wallace procure the property
in question from their mother by undue influence and
overreaching.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The law is that where a grantor is enfeebled in mind
and body or a confidential relationship exists a pre~
sumption of invalidity arises that the burden of proof
shifts and the grantee or donee, must show by clear and
convincing proof that the transactions were fair, voluntarily and free of fraud, undue influence or over-reaching
and that the grantor had the required mental capacity.
It is our position that at the time of the conveyances
and transfers in que'Stion Mrs. Buttars was enfeebled in
mind and body, that there existed between her and the
grantees, Archulius and W alla:ce, a confidential relationship. That they took advantage of her condition and this
relationship and by undue influence persuaded their
mother to convey to them the property, both real and
personal, in question.
MENTAL CONDITION
At the time of the death of her husband in 1916,
Emma G. Buttars was 51 years old. Certain of her
children, Dan, Margaret, Melvin, Maybell, Gover and
Orson were all married, while Ira, Hattie, Archulius and
Wallace were still at home. Emma G. Buttars, Dan and
Melvin were appointed administrators of the estate of
Daniel Buttars, deceased, and on March 10, 1917, Decree
of Final Distribution and Partition was entered by the
Di'strict Court of Cache County in which the Court adopted
the plan proposed by the three administrators. After the
death of the father Mrs. Buttars, Gover and Ira took over
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the active management and operation of the farm. Ira
later married, sold his 60 a:cres to Gover and moved to
Burley, Idaho. Gover operated the farm until1930 when
he moved to Burley, Idaho, and sold his 120 acres to his
mother, thus increasing her hoidings by this acreage.
From 1930 to the date of the 'death of his mother, Wallace
has operated the farm pursuant to the terms of certain
leases.
Gover ·and Ira remained in Burley, where Ira died
in 1949. Melvin lived at Cornish and Dan at Lewiston,
Utah. Both of them always made frequent trips to Clarkston to visit their mother. Melvin's wife was a Clarkston
girl, so he made frequent trips to see his mother-in-law
and mother, also. Hattie married, moved to Burley and
later to Garland. W a:llace married and built a horne just
a few rods from where his mother lived. Archulius lived
a;crolss the ·street. Mayben and Margaret both lived in
Clarkston, close to their mother's home. Family ties were
strong and they a!ll visited back and forth frequently. The
record shows that the grandchildren, the children of Dan,
also upon o1ccasion more or less frequently, visited with
their grandmother.
AU of the evidence is also to the effect that Emma
G. Buttai"s was a lady of resolute will, inclined to be very
frugal and saving in her disposition, and habits, and that
she enjoyed good health until the year 1940 and that from
the time of the death of her husband in 1916 until the
many conveyances and transfers made by her beginning
with the year 1945, she not only made none but that she
in~crea:sed her holdings by purchasing an additional 120
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acre trarc't of land from her son Gover, besides the money
in the banks, the bonds herein mentioned and the First
Security Bank Stock. The re·cord is also cle:ar that up
until the year 1940 the deceased always enjoyed good
health and that th·ereafter she was never the same strong
and healthy individual nor di'd she transact any business.
The Buttars family was a united one until the fall of
1950. The children visited with their mother and Wallace
continued to operate her farm on a share basis. No one
interfered. The record is silent as to any quarrel ever
between the mother and any of her children.
In 1940 Emma G. Buttars was 75 years old. She
became seriously ill and thereafter wa:s never the same.
About everything was wrong with her. She suffered
from hardening of the arteries, high blood pressure, heart
ailment, kidney trouble, and terrific headaches. Deterioration had set in. Every indication of senility was and
remained appare·nt. She couldn't remember recent events,
from morning until later in the day. She didn't recognize
some of her eidest grandsons, nor their wives. One month
before she made her will, she didn't realize her son, Dan,
had died nor could she remember or carry on coherent
conversations. She worried over finances wlien she in
fact had plenty. Her mind was confused over finances
and property particularly and she con·stantly worried
about having enough to live on. She was forgetful,
particularly as to recent events, disliked people for no
reason at all, would repeat, ask the same thing over and
over again, hide 'silve·rware in bed, accuse some of her
children of borrowing from her when they liad not, hide
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money, 'Couldn't distinguish between her own property
and that of her sorrs. She didn't know what she had or
possessed in the way of property or what she had done
or signed away. There was no doubt mental deterioration
had taken pl.ace. Her condition became so bad that the
family didn't want her condition generaHy known. Long
before 1945 deceased failed to attend to any of her own
business affairs. All 'She did was to sign checks and follow
Wallace or be led around by him. ( Tr. 360).
In late summer or early fall of 1944 W atlace and
Archulius called the family together and it was there
reported that their mother was not physicaily or mentally in a condition to be left alone. The appointment of
a guardian was suggested. Before her will was made she
did not know that pursuant to an arrangement Wallace.
was caring for her finances, nor that thereafter in 1951
and 1952, her daughters were taking turns in caring fo~
her and we:re being pa:i!d therefor. After returning from
the hospital following her first illness her daughters
cared for her without pay. She ~lso had a second serious
illness in 1944. Such is the positive testimony of appellants and respondents.
Tho:se of the appellants' witnesses who te'stified are
all gr&wn person:s, 40 years of age or thereabouts, all
of whom were intimately acquainted with the deceased
during her lifetime, knew of her physicai and menta'l condition earlier in her life, and each of them visited with
their grandmother at different intervals after her illnes's
in 1940, and so were competent witnesses.
When she made her will she declared that she was
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treating all of her chi'ldren equally, and then omitted
her deceased son Dan's children upon the mistaken belief
that he had not repaid a loan, whi'le he had, several years
before, and then sold property worth $2,000.00 for $500.00
to Archulius.
We contend that in view of the foregoing fructs the
grantor was enfeebled in body and in mind and the burden was upon the grantees to show mental condition and
that 'the trans·action wa:s fair and free of undue influence.
Less degre:e of proof is required to estab'lish mental
irrcapacity and undue influence in the ca;se of an en-·.
feebled grantor.
In Kadogan v. Booker, 66 SE 2d 297, 302 (W. Va.)
the court said :
"Less evidence is required to estabiish incompetency when a grantor is aged and enfeebled
in mind and body."
And when a grantor sells property for an inadequacy of consideration, although not conclusive evidence
of incompetency, it is persuasive.
Here we have a sale by Mrs. Buttars of land worth
$2,000.00 for $500.00.
In 26 O.J.S. Deeds, Sec. 54, page 268, it says:
"Inadequacy of ·consideration is persuasive,
a:lthough not conclusive, evidence of mental incapacity, and where mental weakness and inadequacy of consideration co-exist they may together
furnish ground for invalidating a deed."
And where a grantor is enfeeb'led in mind and body
a presumption of invalidity arises and 'the grantees must
overcome the presumption and show that the transaction
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was fair and free of undue influence and that the grantor
had the reqursite mental capacity.
In Johnson v. Reese, 249 SW 2d 538, (Ky.) the
grantor when 87 years old executed a deed in favor of
his daughter and her husband who were living with him.
He was enfeebled and needed someone to take care of
him. Short'ly before the grantees moved in with him
some of his children consulted an attorney regarding
having a committee appointed to handie his estate. The
daughter knew this. The court said:
"In view of the relationship between the parties, the age and physical condition of the grantor,
we think the burden was upon appe'llants to prove
the transaction was voluntarily entered into and
fully comprehended by him."
In Morris v. Williams-Garrison, 128 S.E. 78, 99 W.
Va. 140, the grantor was 63 years old, sub-nonnal, a
moron, and someone always helped him manage hi'S affairs. The court S aid :
"The defendant has signally failed to overcome the presumption of incapacity, which arises
from the mental weakness of the grantor, the absence of consideration for the conveyance, and the
other circumstances of this case."
1

In Johnson v. Johnson, 191 N. W. 353, 196, Iowa, 343,
the grantor executed a deed in favor of his wife on September 29, 1919, while in the hospital, he was 80 years old,
had been taken to the hospita:l on the 1st of September
in a coma, W as operated on on September 6. There was
a dispute as to his mental condition after the operation,
plaintiffs claiming he did not change and the defendants'
1
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witnesses claiming that it cleared up. As to the burden
of proof the, court said:
"In view of the undisputed mental incapacity
of the decedent at a stage of his illness prior to
the execution of the deed, the plaintiffs made
a prima facie case and the burden was thereby
cast upon the defendant to show the restoration
prior to September 29; and, in view of the decedent's undoubted weakened condition, both mental
and physical, and of his own he'lples'sness and utter
dependence upon his wife to provide for him, she
must be deemed as the dominant personality and
as fiduciary at least for the time being. The burden was therefore cast upon the defendant to
show, not only the mental caprucity of decedent,
but also that the ex~cution of the deed wa:s not
the result of the stress of undue influence exercised upon him in his helplessness."
The supreme court of New Mexico in Morgarn v.
Thompson, 127 P. 2d 1037, states the ru1e thus:
"Finally, in the case of a reaJl mental weakness, ~a pre'sumption arises against the validity
of the transaction, and the burden of proof rests
upon the party claiming the benefit of the conveyance or contract to show its perfect fairness
and the capacity of the other party."
II.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

The evidence is conclusive that there existed a confidential relationship between Emma G. Buttars and her
children A rchulius and Wall ace, at the time the transfers or attempted transfers were made.
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ARCHULIUS ARCHIBALD

Archulius was the ninth child of Emma G. Buttars,
12 ye ars of age when her father died in 1916, and she
lived with her mother until she married in 1921, after
whrch she: lived across the street. She talked with her
mother daily, was in her mother's home or her mother
was in her home each day, except when she was away for
a few days ~at a time.
After her mother became seriously itl for the second
time in 1944 (the first time was 1940) she helped her
mother with her sewing, with the family record book,
bought her mother's grocerie's and necessities and helped
manage her home generally. Her mother entrusted her
with checks signed in blank and in the cashing of che'cks
and the custody of a $5000.00 savings deposit book.
She exercised such influence and dominance over
her mother that she persuaded her to remove W ailace's
name from the $5000 savings account, took her mother
to Logan where 'she supervised the removal of his name
from the account only to be defeated in this when w~anace
again persuaded his mother to reinstate him; and her
mother reposed such implicit confidence in her and she
exercised such dominance over her mother that her
mother sold her land worth $2000 for $500.
Archulius agreed that all of the foregoing facts were
true except that she would have us believe that she did
not advise with her mother in regard to the removal of
Wallace's name from the savings account although she
does admit she took her mother to Logan to accomplish
this purpose and was present with her mother at the
1

1
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bank when it was done.
These fa:cts under the authorities establish that a
confidential relationship existed between them; particularly is this true in the light of her mother's physical and
menta1 condition.
WALLACE BUTTARS

W a;l'lace Buttars was the tenth and last child of
Emma G. Buttars. He was nine years of age when his
rather died. He lived with her until his marriage and
then next door.
After Mrs. Buttars' husband's death in 1916, Gover
and Ira rented her farm and one of them always assisted
her in the C!onduct of her affairs. In 1930 Wallace began to
operated her farm on a lease basis. Thereafter he assisted
her in the management of her affairs until her death.
Over the years he talked with her twice daily. She advised with him and he says relied upon him explicitly, advised with her on practically :all matters pertaining to
financial affairs, made out her income tax returns, told
her of financial obligations and what biils. to pay, comingled his grain with hers and ·secured joint government
loans, advised her as to what lawyer she should consult,
his lawyer, regarding her affairs.
In 1944 at a family meeting which he and Archulius
called to eonsider their mother's condition and affairs,
he objected to his brother Melvin's suggestion that a
guardian be appointed to look after his mother's financial
affairs, saying that h€ ·cou'ld and would look after them
and that a guardian was not needed.
1
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Under these facts can there be any question but that
a confidential relationship existed between Emma Buttars and Wallace during the time of the transactions in
question~

There is no question but that both Archuiius and
Wallace occupied a confidential relationship with their
mother-that her physical and mental condition required
·in the later years of her life she confide and advise with
someone. These two were the natural persons to assmne
suGh relationship.
Appellants sustained their burden and established
such a relationship as a matter of fact and law.
In determining whether a confident~al relationship
exists the Court, among other things, takes into consideration the experience and business affairs of the grantor,
her age, physical and mental condition, whether there
exists a disparity in the mental qualities of the grantor
and grantee, and the confidence reposed. The relationship need not be legal, may be either moral, social, domestrc or merely personal.
In Fisher v. Burgiel, 46 NE 2d, 380, 385 (Il'L) the
grantor wa.s 77 ye·ars old, mentally ill, he had been friendly with Mary Burgi~l,. for 35 years, they lived next door
for about 22 years. Anthony Burgiel di'd odd jobs for
her. About a year before the deeds were made she spent
part of her time with them in their home for which they
were paid. From January 1938 to August, 1939, she made
withdrawals from bank with checks written in Mrs. Burgiel's handwriting and signed by her. The Court said:
"It is settled law that Courts of equity will
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I·•

li

not set any bounds to the facts and circumstances
out of which a fiduciary relationship may spring.
A fiduciary relationship with its legal incidents
indudes not only aU legal and technical relations
such as guardian, and ward, attorney and 'Client,
prirrcipa;I ~and agent, and the like, but it extends
to every possible case in which a fiduciary relationship exists in fact, and in which there is confidence reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence on the other. * * * The relationship need not be legal but it may be either moral,
social, domestic, or merely personal."
In Mead v. Gilbert, 185 A. 668, 693, (Maryland) the
grantor was between 70 and 80 years old, seriously ill
when the deeds were made. Son took over and had been
managing his mother's affairs. The Court said:
"The question comes finally to this that where
a conveyance from a parent to a child is attacked,
the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is a fact to be ·shown, as in any
other case where it is not presumed as a matter
of law. (U pman v. Thomey, Supra), and that in
such an inquiry advanced age, physical debility,
and mental feebleness are all facts, not one of
whrch is necessary conclusive, but any one of
which may have weight in determining whether
the re~lationship as a fact existed."
In Woolwine v. Bryant, 54 N.W. 2nd 759 (Iowa) the
grantor turned to the grantee when her husband died,
the grantee accompanied her when she left home, ran her
errands, purchased her supplies, coUected the rentals
from the farm and deposited them in the bank, cared for
the leasing of her farm and had a right to write checks
on her ~account. The court said:
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"That equity takes cognizance of transactions
between parties occupying a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and will grant relief where
such relationship has been abused, is well recognized. A confidential r~lationship is said to exist
where one has gained the confidence, of another
and purports to act or advise· with the other's interest in mind. Where such a confidential relationship is found to exist between 'a grantor and a
grantee a presumption against the validity."
In Longmire v. Kruger, 251 P. 6.92, (Calif.) the
Court said:
"Unquestionably this is the rule of equity,
·and a deed of conveyance from a parent to a child
is not presumed to be inVJalid. Indeed, without
further facts, just the contrary is true, and such
a deed is presumed to be valid. 3 Thompson on
Real property, 1052, sec. 2886; 2 Pomero;y's Equity Jur. (.4th Ed.) 2076, sec. 962. But when the
parent is aged, infirm, or otherwise in a condition of dependency upon the child, who exercises
authority over him, a presumption arises which
pla·ce:S the burden upon the beneficiary of the
gift conveyance, to show the transaction was fair
and free from fraud. Equity will scrutinize such
a transaction with great care, and, under such
circumstances, s'light evidence will suffice upon
which to base a finding of undue influence and
set aside the deed."
And your Court in Omega Investment Company v. Woolley, et al, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797, quotes
with approval the following language from 2 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 956, as follows:
"Wherever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence is neces-
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sarily reposed hy one, and the influence which naturally grows out of tha;t confidence is possessed
by the other, and this ·confidence is ~abused, or the
influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the
expense of the confiding party, the person so
availing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although the transaction could not have been impeached if no such
confidential relation had existed. Courts of equity
have careful'ly refrained from defining the particul,ar instances of fiduciary relations in such
manner that other and perhaps new cases might
be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming
weight of authority that the prilnciple extends to
every possible case in which a fiduciary relation
exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on on.e side, and the resulting superiority
and influence on the other. The relation and the
duties involved in it need not be legal; it may
be mor.al, social, domestic, or merely personal."
(Italics added.)
III.
And where there exists a confidential relationship,
such as existed here, a presumption arises that the transactions were invalid and the burden shifts to the grantee
to overcome the presumption and show that the transactions were fair and free of overreaching or u-ndue influence; and the grantor's mental capacity.
The rule is wel'l stated in Omega Investment Company v. Woolley, et al, 72 U. 474,488,271 P. 797, the court
said:
"Thus, in tr'ansactions between persons occupying such relations, in which the stronger or
superior party obtains a benefit or advantage,
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fraud is presumed, and the burden is cast upon
the superior party to show fairness, adequacy,
~and equity in the transa~tion." Peterson v. Budge,
35 u. 695, 102 p. 211.
And the burden is upon the grantee to show by clear
and convincing proof that the transactions were fair and
free of fraud or undue influence, and that the grantor
had the necessary mental capacity.
The rule is stated in Hayes v. Thornsbrough, et al,
69 P. 2d 664, 667, 180 Okl. 357. The court said:
"The defendant occupied the dominant position in the relation, and once it is established., the
transaction in which he obtained ~a deed from
plaintiff is presumptively fraudulent. The defendant is, therefore, under the burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that there has been
no abuse of the confidence, and that he has acted
in good faith and that the transaction was perfectly fair ·and supported by adequate consideration."
In the case of Fuson, et al v. Fuson, 57 S.W. 2d 42,
43, 24 7 Ky. 380, the court said:
"But where the parties involved occupy a confidential relationship toward ea:ch other, and the
consideration is not fixed in amount, but is wholly
undetermined, dependent upon future events rendering its efficacy problematical, then the burden
is cast upon the beneficiaries of the contract
(grantees in a deed) to show by clear and convincing proof that the. transaction was fair ·and free
from the taint of any undue influence, overreaching or fraud."
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IV.
LACK OF INDEPENDENT ADVICE
Although there is authority that the lack of independent advice, where a confidential relationship exists,
or the gra.ntor is mentally infirm in and of itself is not
grownds to set aside a conveyance, but is to be considered with all other circumstances, the better rule is and
the one adhered to by this court that where the grantor
did not ha.ve independent advice, this lacking if fatal to
the transaction an,d the transfers both real and personal
will be set aside.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the grantor,
Mrs. Buttars, even though she was 80 years of 'age and
more, and if not mentally incompetent, was both mentally and physically enfeebled, had any independent
advice regarding the transa'ctions in question. In contrast to this when she made her will she was closete·q
with an attorney alone, received independent advice and
exercised her free will and as a result attempted to provide in her will her intention that all of her children and
the children of her deceased children should be treated
equally. Wallace and Archulius both maintain that they
dtd not know of this provision in their mO'ther's will and
Archulius that she did not know that her mother had
attempted to give her stocks and bonds to recompense
her for the mill sto ck received from her father's estate,
which became valueles·s. This is unworthy of belief.
Wallace took his mother to a lawyer of his choice in the
making of her will. He and Archulius were their mother's
advisers and they talked with her daily. Then, instead
1
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of taking their mother to a lawyer or other person where
she might get independent a:dvice and .exercise her free
will they took her to abstractors and notary publics to
have her legal papers executed, the deeds, where they
could supervise the transactions, see that it was done in
keeping with their wishes and under their influen'ce and
dominance and n'ot in the free exercise of her will.
The Supreme Court of thi's State in Omega Investment Compamy v. Woolley, et al, 72 U. 474, 490, 271 P.
797, laid down the rule that it was the duty of the person
accepting the conveyance to see that the grantor ha:d
disinterested advice and full information. The Court
S'aid:
"Whenever there exists between parties confidence on the one hand and influence on the other,
from whatever cause they may spring, equity requires in all dealings between them the highest degree of good faith on the part of him in whom the
confidence is reposed. If a conveyance is executed
by the other in his favor, the burden rests upon
him to prove that lt was not procured by means
of such confidence and influence. It is his duty,
before accepting the conveyance, to see that the
grantor has disinterested advice and full information."
In Ham v. Ham, 110 So. 583, 146 Miss. 161, the court
said:
"The usual method of proving independent
consent and action in such cases, and probably
the on'ly way it can be clearly proven, is by showing that in making the deed the grantor acted on
the a:dvice of a competent person, disconnected
from the grantee and devoted wholly to the grantor''S interest."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
And in Beals v. Ares, 185 P. 780, 795, (N.M.) the
Supreme Court of New Mexi~co, in a case involving a confidential relationship said:
"I take it to be a well-established principle of
this court that persons standing in confidential
relations towards others cannot entitle themselves
to hold benefits which those, others may have
conferred upon them, unless they can show to the
satisfaction of the court that the persons by whom
the benefits have been 'conferred had competent
and independent advi'ce in conferring them. This,
in my opinion, is a settled general principle of the
court, and I do not think that either the age or
the capacity of the person conferring the benefit
or the nature of the benefit conferred affects the
principle. Age and 'Capacity are considerations
which may be of great importance in cases in
which the principle does not apply; but I think
they are but of little, if any, importance in cases
to which the principle is applicable. They may afford a sufficient protection in ordinary cases, but
they can afford but little protection in cases of
influence founded upon confidence."
Thus on this principle alone, independent of the other
evidence in the case which shows the exercise of undue
influence and overreaching on the part of Wallace Buttars and Archulius, the court should set aside the transactions in question, the two deeds, $5,000.00 savings account and the bonds to Wallace and the 2 deeds and the
U. S. Savings bonds to Archulius.
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v.
The evidence established that the transfers and gifts
of personalty were the results of over-reachinJg and undue
influence.
We contend that because the grantor-donor did not
have any independent advice regarding the conveyances
and gifts of personalty in question they should be set
aside and vacated. However, it is not necessary that we
stop here, for the evidence unquestionably establishes that
both Wallace and Archulius secured tlieir deeds and the
personal property by overreaching and undue influence
and in any event .they did not overcome the presumption
of invalidity and establish by clear and convincing proof
that the 'transfers were fair and not the result of undue
influence.
Undue influence can rarely be proved by diree;t evidence and usually it is shown by circumstantial evidence.
In determining whether overreaching or undue influence
existed, or when the burden of proof shifts, the lack of
undue influence, the courts, among other things, take into
consideration the age, mental and physical condition of
the grantor, opportunity for overreaching, the activity
and interest of the grantee in bringing about the execution, of the instruments, the secrecys surrounding them,
divergence of the results n·orma1ly to be expected, previous declarations of the grantor inconsistent with the
results accomplished, improbability of the rea;son given
for the transfers and lack of independent advice. All
of these lan'dmarks and others are present here.
The evidence proved, and we shall not set it forth
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again, that the grantor was enfeebled in mind and body
and in such a condition that she could easily be imposed
upon not only because of lier enfeebled condition but as
there existed a confidential relationship between her
and Wal'lace and Archulius. They had the opportunity
to overreach her. They were her confidants and advisors,
and as such they talked with her daily.
WALLACE

It is undisputed that in 1944 Wallace and Archulius
called a family meeting because of their mother's condition to 'dis'cuss and decide what should be done with
regard to her, and, although it was recognized that she
needed heip, they and others opposed the appointment
of a guardian. It was this decision that laid the foundation of what was to folloiW.
On March 22, 1945, Mrs. Buttars made her will by
an attorney recommended by Wa:llace and with the aid
of independent advice and in the exercise of her free, will
solemnly deC'lared that it was her intention to treat all
of her children and the children of her decea:sed children
equally, an'd this would have been accomplished except
that be'cause of her mental condition she had forgotten
that her son Dan had repaid the money that he had borrowed from her several years before.
In direct contradiction of this provision in he!r will
six days later ~she began to deed her property away and to
prefer Wallace for on March 28, 1945, she deeded him
60 acres 'of land worth about $12,000.00. Wallace maintain's that he did not know that his mo'ther had made a
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will, or that in it she provided for her children equally1
although he ·said he knew of the intended execution of
the deelds and he recommended that she go to the lawye1r
who made the will and took her to his office and then
called for her after the will was made. Is this to be
believe'd 1 It is revealing that instead of taking the grantor back to the lawyer who drafted the will six days before or some othe~r attorney or other person where she
could and woul'd receive independent advice regarding
the adv~sability of the transfer, Wallace took her to an
abstractor and notary public who drafted the deed for
her signature.
Wallace says his mother told him the reason for this
gift was that he didn't get what his brothers got when
his father was alive. How does this square with the facts?
It is true that prior to his father's death in consideration of his eider sons working on the farm and helping
him acquire his holdings, that he gave either 60 or 80
acres of land to 1:hem. He also permitted three of them
to buy other lands. The gifts were given on the b'o;ys'
marriages except as to Ira, who received his when 17
years old as his father did not expect to live long. There
was a good reason for his father and mother not giving
any land to Wallace. He· was only 9 years of age when his
father died and had in no way helped his father and
mother in creating the estate and Wallace was, at the age
of 9, to inherit from his father property which, unlike
the others, he hald not helped accumulate. There is no
merit to this alleged reason and it is further borne out
by the undisputed facts that his mother as his guardian
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with money earned from the property he had inherited at
the age of 9 purchased 40 acres of wheat land and a oneha:lf interest in 120 acre tract of land, part of whi'ch was
subsequently broken up and became wheat producing.
Wallace, by the time he married had property equal
to or in excess of that given to his brothers plus that
inherited by them.
Thus no ineqUities existed that required his mother
to give him 60 acres of land. Thl.s is further borne orut
when you take into consideration that since 1930 Wallace
had the use and benefit on a lease basis of 300 acres of
his mother's land. So, the reason he gives for this gift
mus~t fal'l of its own weight when considering the l'ight
of these facts and circumstances
This property was deeded without the knowledge of
his brothers and sisters in secrecy. He did not tell any of
them of the intende'd transfers and, except as to Archulius, they did not learn of it until 1950 at which time
he says the family lo'st confidence in him.
The next giH to Wallace is the $5000.00 jo'int savings
account on January 29, 1947. This was the same day
that his mother gave Archulius her 48 acres of land.
It wouid thus appear that when Archulius learned of
the conveyance of the 60 acres of land to Wallace (the
first 60 to Wallace) she concluded that if Wallace was to
be preferred by her mother she could likewise benefit
and she put into execution her plan to persuade her
mother to give her property, and in doing this she would
work with Wallace when her interest p,rofited by it, and
Wallace accepted her as a jo!int conspirator when it was
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to his interests. It is not entirely clear who took Mrs.
Buttars to Logan when the deed of the 48 acres of land
to Archulius and the $5,000.00 joint tenancy savings account was created, as Archulius says she took her there
and W allaee says he took her home. In regards to the
$5,000.00 savings a;ccount Wallace says he did not know
that his mother was going to make him this gift until she
to'ld him on the way home. Wallace gave no reason for
this gift. Apparently, there was none, he could not justify it and the only conclusion that can be reached is that
it was due to overreaching and undue influence.
It is apparent that Wallace and Archulius not only
worked together when it se·rved their interests but they
worked separately and at times attempted to nullify each
others efforts. Thl.s is a fair inference from the evidence.
She was to get the 48 acres and in so doing he was to increase his holdings by the $5,000.00 savings account. In
acc~mplishing their purpose they were prepared to work
together and then repent at leisure. So Archulius, after
getting her gift of the 48 acres, persuaded her mother to
take Wallace's name off the joint savings acc·ount, took
her to Logan and supervised the accomplishment of this
only to be defeated when Wallace learned of it and he
again had his mothe:r create a joint tenancy in the savings
account. These transactions were also 'Secret and not
known to the rest of the family until the fall of 1950 except that Mayben learned of Archulius' gift ab'out a year
after it was made. In the light of these facts were not
these gifts the result of overreaching and undue influence?
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That Wallace was overreaching his aged and
enfeebled mother according to a plan is borne out by
the fact that again on May 6, 1948, he had his mother
deed him another 60 acres worth about $12,000.00. Again
this was done without the knowledge of the family and
he took his mother to an abstractor and notary public at Logan who made the deeds, not to an attorney or
other person where she could get independent advice.
Now listen to the reason for this conveyance-his mother
gave it to him because ·the other boys were given 60 or 80
acres when they were 20 or 22 years old and they were
permitted to buy another 60 or 80. This, like the reason
given for the first 60 must fall of its own weight, for the
reasons heretofore mentioned in discussing W aUace's attempted justification for his mother giving him the first
60 acres, and for the further reason that neither Gover
or Ira had the opportunity to purchase any land, and
none of the other boys except Ira and Gover were permitted for over 20 years to lease 300 acres of their
mother's Iarrd. If this is reason to be believed we ask
why did not his mother convey him this 60 acres when
she conveyed the first on March 28, 1945. If the reason
existed in 1948 it likewise existed in 1945. Why didn't
she give him both sixtie·s on March 28, 1945 ¥ Why wait¥
We submit that this is fabrication pure and simple and
is not entitled to any serious consideration.
In addition to the three gifts above mentioned 'totalling approximately $29,000.00 his mother also attempted
to give him $1125.00 maturity value in government bonds.
These were found when the safety de'posit box was open-
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ed. Wallace claimed he had no knowledge that these
gifts were made or intende'd. To this we merely say that
in View of ail of the facts in this case and considering
that he was his mother's adviser, talked with her twice
a day and then stated to Maybell that when his mother's
safety bo~ was opened "there'd be hell a-poppin," is this
to be believed~
I·
It is readily apparent that Mrs. Buttars' physical
and mental con'dition was enfeebled and that she was in a
condition to be taken advantage of by her children
regardless of ~whether they occupied a position of trust
and confidence and that two of them on recognizing this
fact, that is Archulius and Wallace, did so; that she was
imposed upon is further borne out by the fact that sometime between 1950 and her death she tol'd her daughter
Margaret and on other occasions her daughters Maybeil
and Arch uli us her affairs were· in a me·ss, she didn't
know what she had done with her property and asked
that they straighten them out.
The mere fact tha.t the deeds contained the retention of a life estate is of no particular significance, as if.
Mrs. Buttars intended to prefer Wallace and Archulius,
she could have done so in her will.
It is also of some significance that Wallace knew
before the execution of his deeds that they were to be
made, that he disclaims any knowledge whatsoever that
he knew his mother was going to make a will or that she
had made one.
lf Wal'lace was not overreaching his aged and enfeebled mother why all the secrecy surrounding the trans-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45
actions? Why did he not take the rest of the family in his
confidence or at 1eas·t make arrangements for her to ge:t
independent advice from some person who had her interests in mind.
It was established by dear and convincing proof'
that Wallace overreached and secured the gifts in question from the exercise of undue influence and in any
event he did not discharge his burden of proof, overcome
the presumption of invalidity, and show by clear and convincing proof that the gifts were not the· results of unfairness, overreaching or undue influence.
ARCHULIUS

,.

It should be kept in mind that Emma G. Buttars
and her husband did not treat their daughters the same
as they did their sons. When Mr. Buttars was alive, upon
the marriage of his sons, as mentioned before, he gave
each of them 60 or 80 acres of land, but none to his
daughters. There were four giris in the family. Margaret and Maybell married prior to their father's death.
Among the assets of their father's estate were several shares of Clarkston-Trenton Mill Stock, some of which
was distributed to Archulius and Hattie, having a value
of $2640.00 to eaeh. This stock at this time was considered a good investment. However, within a few years
it became valueless.
When the safety deposit box was opened besides
the $1125.00 maturity value bonds to WaHace and $550.00
maturity value bonds to a grandson, there was found that
Mrs. Buttars had attempted to give one $1,000.00 rna-
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turity value and three $500.00 maturity value bonds and
22 shares of First Security Corporation stock to Archulius and the same to Hattie. Attached to the $1,000.00
bonds and ~stock certificates in each instance was a statement that because the Clarkston-Trenton Mill stock had
become worthless this gift _was being made to them. The
statement was dated April 9, 1945, or 16 days after the
date of the will.
Archulius maintained that she didn't know of these
attempted gifts nor the reason therefor until the safety
deposit box was opened. Is this to be believed if her
statement is true that every year her mother said she
was going to make it up to her because the stock had become worthiess ~
On January 29, 1947, Archulius said she took her
mother to Logan ; this was the same date of the alleged
$5,000.00 joint tenancy gift in favor of Wallace, and to
the o:ffice of an a~stractor and notary public who prepared the de'ed for her mother's signature giving her 48
acres of land worth about $9600.00. The deed was given
without the knowledge of the other mem·bers of the
family except, undoubtedly, W a:llace, and they did not
learn of it until the fall of 1950 at the service station
meeting. However, there is some evidence that Maybell
learned 'Of it about a year after it was made.
Archulius said her mother gave her this property,
the 48 acres, because the Clarkston-Trenton Mill Stock
became worthless. This was the same reason her mother
gave in 1945 for giving her and her sister Hattie each a
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$1,000.00 bon.d and 22 shares of First Security Bank
stock.
Now 'let's examine this reason and see if it he believed in the light of all the facts and circumstances.
We have before pointed out that this gift of 48
acres was accomplished the same day as the gift of the
$5,000.00 savings account to Wallace and although Archu-'
lius says she took her to Logan to the office of Mr.·
Crockett, an abstractor and notary public, who prepared
the deed, it would appear from the evidence that she was
either accompanied by Wallace or met him in 'town, as he
says he took his mother home on January 29, 1947, and
then first learned of the $5,000.00 gift. It must be concluded then that they were engaged in a common pur-·
pose, that is, she was to get the 48 acres provided Wallace
got the $5,000.00 gift.
In all likelihood Archulius learned that Wallace had
secured the 60 acres from his mother and she decided
that if he was to so benefit, she would likewise prevail upon her mother and secure a preference for herself. Thus, she enlisted the help of Wallace (probably
under the threat of exposure) and he joined with her in
accomplishing this purpose with the understanding that
in so doing he was to get the $5000.00 savings account.
This concession she was willing to give and she either
acquiesced 'in it without reservation, or she decided at a
later date that Wallace was and had secured a disproportionate amount from her mother. In line with this
she prevailed upon her mother to terminate the joint
tenancy, only to have Wallace at a later date again have
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his name reinstated on the savings account as a joint
tenant. Does this point to anything except that they were
overreaching their mother and using her as pawn to be
moved about as they willed~
Then when confronted by her brothers. and sisters
regarding her taking advantage of her mother, she had to
have some reason and the only one she could think of that
might have some basis was that it was given to her because of the mill stock. In so doing she could expJain
this away by saying that she didn't kno·w that her mother
had theretofore made an attempt to reimburse her for
this loss. An additional fallacy in this, and one which
clearly shows the falseness of her reason; is that she and
her sister Hattie had both received the same amount of
mill stock. Hattie's likewise became worthless and yet
her mother did not give her 48 acres or any other properties except, orf course, the bond and shares of stock
which Archulius had likewise received. If her mother
believed any inequities existed that should be remedied
with reference to the mill stock, she had already taken
care of this and Hattie was included in the program. If
she was to get 48 acres because of the mill stock this
reason existed on April 9, 1945, when her mother gave the
stock and bonds for the same reason. Why not transfer
then or a prorvision made in the will~
In line with this it should be kept in mind that the
grantor realized that •she had been taken advantage of.
However, she did not know how, as sometime between
1950 and her death she asked her daughter Margaret and
again her daughters Maybell and Archulius to straighten
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out the mess she was in at which time Archulius said,
"Let's not bother her." What didn't Archulius want
brought to light~ And again Archulius told her sister
Maybell that her mother did not even read the deed and
she just as well had the City Creek property. The City
Creek property was 160 acres.
That Archulius was, as well as Wallace, pursuing a
program of taking advantage of their aged and enfeebled mother is further borne out by the fact that she
purchased from her mother a tract of land worth $2,000.00 for $500.00. Her mother relied upon her in the
fairness of the transaction.
If Archulius was not taking advantage of her mother
why all the secrecy concerning the transactions~ Why
did she not take her other brothers and sisters into confidence and advise them that her mother was making these
conveyances to her~ The least she could have done was
to see that her mother secured independent advice regarding the advisability regarding them.
The record is free from any evidence that would
justify Wallace and Archulius in their course of conduct
and in procuring over forty percent of their mother's
estate to the detriment of their brothers and sisters and
the children of their deceased brothers.
Another factor to be considered is that while Mrs.
Buttars was well physically and mentally she kept her
estate intact and it was not until she ha:d deteriorated
both physically and mentally that these two children
were able to secure these preferences. Not only this,
but as we have pointed out had their mother intended
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to make a preference she could have done so in her will.
In view of the foregoing we contend that the evidence established by clear and convincing proof that Wallace and Archulius secured the gifts in question upon
the exercise of undue influence and in any event neither
of them diS'charged their burden of proof overcoming the
presumption of invalidity.
We have before pointed out that although some
courts hold that the lack of independent advice is a factor
to be considered in the light of all the evidence that courts
have held and such appears to be the holding orf this
Court in Omeg.a Investment Company v. Woolley, et al,
72 U. 474, 271 P. 797, that the only way that presumption of invalidity can be overcome is by showing that the
grantor had independent advice.
We recognize that each case must stand upon its
own facts, that rarely will the facts of one case be the
same as another. However, we believe that the followillg
cases should be helpful to the Court in determining
whether the transactions were the result of overreaching
and undue influence and whether Wallace and Archulius
discharged the burden of proof in overcoming invalidity
of the gifts.
In Woolwine v. Bryant, 54 N.W. 2d 759 (Iowa) the
Court said:
"While no actual fraud or direct evidence of
undue influence appears in the record, we think
the answer to the case is well stated in the words
of the late Justice Evans, who in Johnston v.
Johnston, 196 Iowa 343, 348, 191 NW 353, 355
stated: 'It is a rare case when the dominant indi-
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vidual in a fiduciary relationship can sustain a
gift to himself by one who is dependent upon
him.'''
In the case of Fuson v. Fuson, 57 EW 2, (Ky.), the
father brought an action to ·cancel a deed to two sons
because of undue influence in which he retained a life
estate. He was 72 years of age, had recently moved in
with one of the grantees, was deaf and had impaired
vision. He had recently been sick and was depressed
over his wife's recent death. His sons were to run the
farm and take care of him. In securing their father's
signature to the deed, they studiously failed to mention
the transactron to any of the grantor's other children.
The court said :
"Without further discussion we unhesitatingly conclude, not only that defendants failed to discharge the burden cast upon them by the rule·,
supra, growing out of the confidential relationship
to their father, the grantor, but the evidence furthermore convinces us that he was actually overreached and procured to execute the deed in controversy contrary to his oft-expressed desires
that all of his children should share equally in his
property, and which he would not have done but
for the chicanery and undue influence practiced
upon him by the defendants. It is true, as we
have heretofore intimated, that no one expressly
testified to any such influencing facts; but the
circumstances detailed in the testimony, the facts
gleaned from the statements made by the defendants, plus their evident reluctance by their "not
remembering" are all most persuasive that the
attached deed was not understandably executed
by plaintiff, nor were the result of his free and
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untrampled will, all of which is ·sustained by the
testimony."
In Bentley vs. Bentley, 119 A. 253 (Maryland) the
grantor when 78 years old gave a deed of trust in favor
of her brother Frank reserving a life estate. The need
of a guardian was discussed by Frank with his brothe·r
Ben, who was excluded, but nothing came of it. She was
feeble and needed assistance. Did not feel good towards
her brother Ben. Frank claimed that his sister called
him wanting to know what she could do to keep her
brother Ben from disposing of everything on the place.
He suggested the appointment of a trustee. F'rank
claimed he did not know that he was to be the beneficiary
until sometime after it was done although he took her to
the home of the draftsman for the execution of the deed.
He did not disclose to his relatives that his sister had
given him the property. The trust deed was set aside.
The Court said:
" 'It is not inconsistent with the exercise of
undue influence or artifice that the instrument
assailed was executed voluntarily and with a
knowledge of its contents.'
" 'The question is not whethe·r she knew what
she was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but
how the intention was produced; whether all that
care and providence was placed around her as
against those who advised her, which from their
situation and relation with respect to her, they
were bound to exert in her behalf.' "
In Myrick vs. Bruetsch, 56 P. 2, 591 (Cal.) the court
set aside a. conveyance wherein the grantor granted a
joint tenancy with himself and a daughter. He could
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not read or write English, one of the defendants was
always present when he did any business. The defendant lived with her father and the conveyance was made
shortly after her mother's death, the papers were prepared by a notary public, and the grantor had no independent advice. Defendant said nothing to her other
brothers and sisters about the transfer until some time
after their father's death. She talked disparagingly
about her brothers and sisters and discouraged them
from visiting with their father. The father expressed
affection for all of his children and could not understand why they did not come often. The grantee went
with her father to the notary public on each occasion
when anything was done in connection with the making
of the conveyance. The father had said he was going
to equally divide his property among his children.
In Overstreet v. Beadles, 101 P. 2d, 874, the Court
set aside two deeds, one made in December, 1927, and
the other in October, 1930. After the deeds were made
they were placed in the grantor's strong box. In the
spring of 1930 or 1931 the grantee went to the bank,
the banker brought the two deeds from the bank, went
to the home of the grantor, handed her the deeds and
in his presence she handed them to her son the grantee,
saying that he could do whatever he de·sired with them.
She told him to take thein and that this land would he
enough to keep him. The Court in setting aside the
deeds said:
"The record is completely void of evidence
that Mrs. Mary A. Beadles had independent ad-
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vice at the time the challenged deeds were dated.
Touching the deed to the Overton land, she probably had nothing to do with its making. After
that deed had remained in darkness for ten
years, it was brought to light just long enough
to be recorded, and then it was conveniently 'lost'
so that the grantor's signature could not be
scrutinized. And in respect to the deed to the
Creek land the testimony of the scrivener and
of the notary contributed nothing from which it
· might be deduced that the grantor had the benefit o:f independent advice in the transaction which
led to its execution or to dispense with its necessity.
In Legler vs. Legler, 211 P. 2d 233, 247, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in setting aside a deed, said:
"This court has held that more mental capacity is required to engage in a transaction involving the execution and delivery of a deed than
to write a will. Gilliam v. Schoen, 176 Or. 356,
157 P. 2d. 682, and Miller v. Jeffery, 129 Or. 674,
278 P. 946. 'Generally, a grantor, unlike a testator, must cope· with another party to the transaction, that is, with a grantee. He must be able
to look out for himself concerning such matters
as consideration, warranty and terms of sale.
When a deed, like the present one, is testamentary
:in character, it might seem that no more mental
capacity should be required of the grantor than
if he executed a will. But deeds, even though testamentary in nature, unlike wills, are not revocable. They afford no opportunity for giving effect
'
to afterthoughts.
And the Court again said:
The deed came forth, in our opinion from
a transaction in· which the appellant partidipated
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under circumstances which demanded an explanation. F·or instance, there was the element of secrecy. So far as we know, there was no ill feeling
between the appellant and the respondents, nor
was there any ill will of which we are aware between the appellant and Mr. Mattson, the tenant.
The secrecy provokes suspicion. The execution
of the deed constituted almost a complete aboutface from previous plans which Mr. Legler had
long entertained and which he had mentioned to
people even outside of the family circle. In fact,
it involved the disposition of his most valuable
asset, not by a will as he had contemplated for
many years, but by a deed."
In Tracey et al vs. Tracey, 163 At. 80 (Maryland)
the court set forth as landmarks of undue influence to
be considered in the light of all of the evidence the
following:
"Landmarks of undue influence are: Divergence of results accomplished from those which
would ordinarily be expected; effect of grant on
grantor; substantial and manifest conflict between deed and purpose of grantor; previous
declarations o:f grantor inconsistent with results
accomplished; marked activity and interest by
beneficiaries in bringing about execution of instrument; and sometimes absence of reasonable
opportunity to secure independent advice from
disinterested sources."
Also see the following cases:
In Re McConkey's Estate, 92 P. 2d, 456
Longmire v. Kruger, 251 P. 692
O'Grady v. O'Grady, 18 P. 2d 373
Sparks v. Mendoza, 189 P. 2d 43
Brown v. Hilleary, 286 P. 593
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Flowers v. Flowers, 221 P. 483
Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n vs.
Crawford, 160 P. 2d 169.
As we have pointed out, Archulius in the purchase
of 10.25 acres of land on March 3, 1948, paid only the
sum of $500.00 for land worth $2,000.00. Inadequacy of
consideration in itself is evidence of undue influence. In
26 C. J. S. Deeds~ Sec. 82, p. 294, it says:
"Inadequacy of consideration will be considered on the issue of undue ·influence and may
combine with opportunity for the exercise of undue influence to show such influence invalidating
a deed."
and in 9 Am. J ur. Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 25,
p. 371, it says:
·
"* * * Inadequacy of consideration for a contract or conveyance may, hoiWever, be sufficiently
gross to he cle·arly indicative of ·imposition or
undue influence, and where coupled ·with weakness
of mind, from whatever cause produced, or with
. pecuniary distress, or circumstances of fraud,
oppression, or undue influence, affords a· proper
case for relief in equity."
In Halloran-Judge & Trust Company vs. Carr, et a~
62 U 10, 218 P. 139, the court declared further that where
the consideration for a deed is so inadequate as to shock
the conscience of the court it will be set aside for this
reason alone.
. CONCLUSION
In conclusion we respectfully submit:
That the evidence is clear that respondent Archulius
Archibald exercised undue influence and overreached her
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mother, and wrongfully induced her to convey to her the·
property described in the two deeds and the government
bonds, and that in any event she did not overcome the
presumption of their invalidity and establish by clear
and convincing proof that they were not the result of
undue influence and overreaching; and the trial court
erred in refusing to vacate and set aside the deeds and
decreeing that the property described therein and the
government bonds were the property of appellants and
respondents subject to the conditions of the last will and
testament of Emma G. Buttars and in failing to direct
an accounting of the rents and profits of the lands subject to her right to set-off in the sum of $500.00 paid by
her for the 10.25 acres.
That the evidence is clear that Wallace Buttars exercised undue influence and overreached his mother and
wrongfully induced her to convey to him the property
described in the two deeds in question, the $5,000.00 savings account and the $1125.00 government bonds and
that in any event he did not over come the presumption
of invalidity and establish by clear and convincing proof
that they were not the result of undue influence and overreaching; and that the trial court erred in refusing to
vacate and set aside the deeds and decreeing that the
property described therein and the $5,000.00 savings account and $1125.00 was the property of appellants and
respondents subject to the conditions of the last will and
testament of Emma G. Buttars and in failing to direct an
account of the rents and profits of the lands subject to
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the terms of the leases thereon ·since the death of his
mother on July 1, 1952.
And this court should enter judgment directing correction of the errors above mentioned.
Appellants pray for such other relief as may be just
and equitable and costs.
Respectfully ·submitted,

L. DELOS DAINES
Salt Lake City, Utah
GEORGE C. HEINRICH,
Logan, Utah
.Attorneys for Appellants.
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